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Abstract 
The legal and institutional setting is more and more influential in firms’ financial 
decisions. Our paper analyses firms’ capital structure in an international framework in 
order to assess the different level of debt use across countries and to identify both 
common and differential explanatory factors. Although the level of financial leverage is 
quite different, the factors that have traditionally driven capital structure decisions have 
much in common in all the legal and institutional settings. The performance and size of 
the firm, the assets tangibility and the growth opportunities have a relevant but 
differential effect across the different institutional systems. Consequently, our results 
suggest that the legal and institutional system of each country does not only affect 
firms’ capital structure but also creates the conditions to explain a differential effect of 
the common determinants of firms’ financial choices. 
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Capital structure and institutional setting: a decompositional and international 
analysis 
1. Introduction 
The capital structure of firms has been the core of an academic debate for a long time. 
This debate has run parallel with the research about the influence of the legal and 
institutional setting on firms’ financial decisions. Laws, and specially investor protection, have 
been proved to have a great influence on the corporate system. In this sense, the analysis of 
the origins of the legal system can help to explain institutional factors such as corporate 
governance, the relative importance of capital markets and the development of some 
industries (La Porta et al., 2000). 
This paper is based on both fields and aims to analyse the capital structure of firms in 
the framework of the legal system of each country. It is a suggestive approach because, 
although most of the research focuses on developed countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), 
there are notable institutional differences between them which should be taken into account. 
This is the main contribution of our paper, as we aim to study the factors determining 
capital structure in an international framework. We do not simply wish to check the different 
financial leverage of the different countries or groups of financial systems; we are also 
interested in analysing different measures of capital structure in order to elucidate how the 
impact of the factors that have traditionally explained capital structure is conditioned by that 
legal and institutional framework. 
Our results stress the significant differences in financial leverage between countries 
and between legal frameworks, and how those differences are not due to different factors but 
to their differential impact. More specifically, we find that the firms belonging to different 
financial systems show big differences in the level of debt and especially in the maturity 
structure of debt. In addition, we document the influence of law enforcement and the quality 
of accounting on firms’ capital structure. 
Our paper can be divided into four sections. Section 2 looks at the main literature on 
this topic and we introduce the theoretical background on which the empirical analysis is 
grounded. Section 3 presents the data, the definition of the variables to be used and the 
statistical methodology. In section 4, the results of the empirical estimation are reported and 
discussed. Section 5 includes the most relevant conclusions and some directions for future 
research.  
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2. Capital structure and the legal system.  
Capital structure has been one of the most controversial topics in finance and there are 
plenty of papers which have tried to identify its determining factors (Barnea et al., 1985; 
Harris and Raviv, 1991; Colombo, 2001). Although not exhaustively, the literature has 
pointed to some of these factors, such as firm size (Marsh, 1982; Jalilvand and Harris, 1984), 
firm performance (Kester, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988), collateral (Bradley et al., 1984; 
Berger and Udell, 1995), growth opportunities (McConnell and Servaes, 1995), the 
ownership structure (Kim y Sorensen, 1986; Bergström y Rydqvist, 1990), debt tax shields 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988) and assets structure (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993), etc. 
In recent years, the literature has paid special attention to the influence of the legal and 
institutional framework on corporate finance. The financial decisions of firms are not isolated 
from the institutional characteristics. In fact, the legal and institutional setting creates a net of 
relations between firms and financial institutions. From this point of view, financial systems 
have traditionally been classified into two main groups, depending on the orientation or 
importance of financial intermediaries (Allen, 1995; Allen and Gale, 2001). 
There is a Continental or bank-oriented system in which banks play a prominent role as 
financial channels from the ultimate lenders to the ultimate borrowers. It is the dominating 
system in Japan and in most Continental European countries such as Germany, France, 
Italy, Spain, etc. There is also an Anglo-Saxon or market-oriented system (e.g., U.S.A., 
United Kingdom, etc.) in which banks are not so important and financial functions are directly 
performed by capital markets. Since both systems show big differences in the extent to which 
the banks are present in the core of the system, there will also be big differences in the 
capital structure of the firms (Rajan & Zingales, 1995 and 1998).  
In spite of the wide support for this classification, the limitations of this criterion have 
been underlined in recent years (Corbett & Jenkinson, 1998; La Porta et al., 2000). The 
banks vs. markets scheme relies on two differentiated levels of financial leverage, and Anglo-
Saxon firms are usually less leveraged than their Continental counterparts (Rutherford, 1988; 
Mayer, 1990). Nevertheless, this assertion has been proved not to be completely exact, 
especially regarding some countries, such as Germany, which are supposed to belong to the 
bank oriented model (Rajan & Zingales, 1998).  
This is why another classification scheme has arisen. Instead of grounding on the 
importance of markets and financial intermediaries, this new criterion is based on the legal 
origins of each country (La Porta et al. 1997 and 1998; Levine, 1998; Levine et al. 2000). 
Basically, countries are classified into two main groups: common law countries and civil law 
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countries. While the law is made by judges in common law countries, legal scholars play a 
prominent role in civil law countries. Civil law countries can be further divided into three 
origins: the French, Scandinavian and German traditions. 
Legal origins determine the characteristics of each system. In fact, creditors’ and 
shareholders’ rights, law enforcement, the quality of accountancy, ownership concentration 
and per capita wealth are quite different, conditional upon investor protection. Investors have 
the best legal protection in common law countries and the worst in the French civil law 
countries. Similarly, law enforcement and the quality of accountancy are higher in the 
common law and in the Scandinavian civil law countries than in the others (La Porta et al.,
1997). 
Financial and institutional systems are relevant because investor protection has a 
positive effect on the development of capital markets (both equity and debt markets) and, 
consequently, it affects firms’ financial strategy. For instance, weak investor protection 
implies a more concentrated ownership and control structure (Himmelberg et al., 2004), 
whereas good protection indirectly leads to the growth of production and productivity through 
a more efficient resources allocation (La Porta et al., 2000). Likewise, the development of the 
banking system is positively related to the protection of creditor rights (Levine, 1998) and 
economic development is enhanced by the institutional framework (i.e. institutional support 
and economic freedom) as found by Assane and Grammy (2003).  
 Hence, the legal framework of each country –especially law enforcement and investor 
protection- has been proved to affect corporate finance (Fabbri, 2001). For instance, 
Giannetti (2003) has shown how intangible assets –which could be the most difficult assets 
to fund-, are more easily funded when creditor rights are better protected and that a lower 
development of capital markets forces firms to use more debt. In addition, Storey (1994) has 
proved that bank financing is affected by the legal status of the firm. 
These two academic fields –namely, capital structure theory and the international 
comparison of financial systems- are the backbone of our paper since we aim to study the 
capital structure of an international sample of firms following a decompositional analysis. 
According to Booth et al. (2001), our research is twofold: firstly, in a descriptive approach, we 
attempt to discover whether capital structure shows significant differences across countries 
and, secondly, we test whether the factors determining firms’ financial decisions have a 
different influence depending on the legal and institutional framework. 
Although the classification scheme according to the institutional environment does not 
necessary imply any prediction concerning financial leverage but about internal and external 
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finance (La Porta et al., 1997), there is evidence of the different level of debt and, more 
specifically, of the different debt maturities across countries. Broadly speaking, firms in the 
civil law countries usually have more debt and shorter maturity of debt than their common 
law counterparts (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Fan et al., 2003). Consequently, we 
could hypothesize that our results are supposed to show higher financial leverage and 
shorter maturity of debt in civil-law countries relative to common law countries.  
3. Data and methodology 
Our data base set is Compustat. As is widely known, Compustat gathers financial 
information with high reliability from a large number of firms. Given the high number of 
countries (and the disparities among them in terms of accounting rules), we have centred on     
balance sheets and income statements from a sample of 10 countries throughout 1997-2002 
(Table 1). These firms can be divided into three of the four above mentioned main 
institutional settings. 
Our methodology follows two steps. The first step is broadly descriptive and aims both 
to compare the level of debt across countries or across legal systems and to test the 
existence of possible significant differences through the analysis of variance (hereinafter 
ANOVA). As stated by Rajan and Zingales (1995), both the level of financial leverage and its 
sensibility to the influencing factors can critically depend on the kind of measure of financial 
leverage. Therefore, we propose a set of different measures of capital structure and we 
decompose them into their basic components. Th  second methodological stage is mainly 
explanatory and aims to test the impact of some factors on capital structure. In this phase, 
we are interested in knowing to what extent the international differences can be explained by 
a different impact of these factors. 
Our sample includes data from Austria and Germany as civil law countries with the 
German tradition, from Canada, the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom as common law 
countries, and from Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium as civil law countries 
with the French tradition. The final distribution by countries and corporate systems is 
reported in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 
We use three main measures of capital structure as suggested by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and, especially, by Bevan and Danbolt (2002), so that we can compare our 
results with those of the above authors. 
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The first measure is a general indicator of financial leverage and includes any kind of 
debt (both financial and commercial debt). We defined B1 as the ratio of financial debt (FD), 
i.e. costly debt, plus commercial debt (CD) to total assets at book value (TA). 
TA
CDFD +
=1B
The second measures explicitly focuses on costly debt and excludes commercial 
debt. Consequently we define B2 as total financial debt to book total assets ratio. 
TA
FD
=2B
The last variable is informative of the relation between debt and costly funds (both 
implicit and explicit cost). These costly funds are costly debt and equity. The main difference 
between this ratio and previous ones is the exclusion of commercial debt and some elements 
which are quite difficult to classify such as deferred taxes, minority interests, non-taxable 
reserves, etc1.
)(
3
BVFD
FDB
+
=
Since an all-inclusive explanation of capital structure is beyond the scope of this 
paper and we simply aim to compare the basic issues of corporate finance across different 
legal and institutional frameworks, we limit our attention to four variables potentially driving 
the capital structure decisions of firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; 
Bhaduri, 2002): growth opportunities, firm size, firm performance and assets tangibility.  
Growth opportunities, according to McConnell and Serva s (1995) and Lasfer (1995), 
are proxied by MTB or the market-to-book ratio (book value of debt plus market equity value 
to book total assets ratio). The size of the firm is measured through the log of the firm’s 
turnover and the performance of the firm is measured with the EBIDTA (earnings before 
interest, depreciation, taxes and amortizations) to total assets ratio. Assets tangibility is 
measured through the assets with a physical existence (PA) to total assets ratio. These 
definitions can be expressed as follows: 
 
1 We have defined three measures of capital structure analogously to B1, B2 and B3 with market 
values instead of book values. Results are not reported for simplicity but are fully consistent. 
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)(
)(
TurnoverLnLOGSALE
TA
VMBVTAMTB
=
+
=
TA
PATANG
TA
EBITDAPROF
=
=
The explanatory analysis is run through regression analysis with the panel data 
method. The model to be tested can be expressed as follows: 
itiititititit TANGPROFLOGSALEMTBL  ++++++= 4321
In this equation, i sub-index stands for the individual and t sub-index for the time. i is 
the fixed-effects term which is firm specific and it is the random component which is 
supposed to introduce all the remaining factors potentially affecting capital structure. The 
fixed-effects term introduces firm specific factors which can be correlated with the set of 
independent variables and whose omission could bias the results of the estimation. This 
fixed effect or unobservable and constant heterogeneity can not only be identified, but also 
treated by panel data procedures (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2004). 
Panel data is basically a multivariate regression analysis along with the use of the 
Hausman test to detect the existence of these underlying individual effects and their 
correlation with the explanatory variables. When the Hausman test suggests the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no correlation between the fixed effects term and the independent 
variables, the within-groups estimation provides consistent estimators. If the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, a random model or generalized least squares provides consistent and 
asymptotically efficient coefficients. 
Nevertheless, there is a lot of literature suggesting the endogeneity of some right-
hand side variables, so we should control for this possible endogeneity (Cho, 1998; Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001). There are a number of procedures to deal with this problem and we 
will stress the generalizad method of moments GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Mairesse 
and Hall, 1996). The GMM is based on the use of instrumental variables according to the 
structure of available lagged variables which are supposed to be endogenous. By counting 
on more instruments than variables to be estimated, GMM provides more efficiently 
estimated coefficients. This is why, in our last stage, we report the results from the GMM 
estimation for MTB and PROF in order to test the robustness of our previous results.  
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4. Results 
The first step is a test of possible significant differences for the measures of capital 
structure among different legal systems. Results are reported in Table 2 and, although they 
are perhaps too detailed, they show a common and persistent pattern for B1, B2 and B3 
across legal systems: whereas firms in the French civil law countries are the most leveraged, 
their German civil law counterparts are the least prone to debt. Although these results hold 
for the three measures of financial leverage, they are inconsistent with our expectations, 
since civil law firms were hypothesized to have more debt than common law firms. 
Consequently, new analyses are required to solve this conflict. 
The next stage is an ANOVA to test the extent to which one can assert that different 
institutional and legal settings have different mean values of capital structure. ANOVA 
results, reported in Table 3, are quite significant and show that we can reject the equality of 
means across the three groups with a confidence level higher than 99%.  
Insert Tables 2 and 3 
Nevertheless, this evidence requires a more detailed development with bilateral 
comparisons between pairs of systems as reported in Table 4. This table shows that, on 
average, the level of financial leverage is significantly different across groups of countries 
and corroborates the fact that firms from the French tradition of civil law countries are the 
most leveraged, whereas their German civil law counterparts are those with the least 
leverage. Consequently, the market vs. banks classification scheme seems to lose 
importance relative to the legal roots and the institutional development criterion for classifying 
countries and explaining financial decisions (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Insert Table 4 
We should note that there are some discrepancies in capital structure (for instance, 
the ranking based on B2 vs. the ranking based on B1 and B3). In order to elucidate this 
issue, we decompose the total debt to total assets ratio (B1) as a function of the maturity 
structure (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Ozkan, 2002). So, we have defined LTDTA as the 
proportion of long term debt over total assets and STDTA as the proportion of short term 
debt over total assets. Even short term debt can be divided into suppliers or commercial debt 
(COMTA) and the other short term debt (OSTDTA)2.
2 All these measures have been scaled by total assets. 
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Results exhibit big differences according to the institutional framework. Consistent 
with our expectations and with previous literature, while Anglo-Saxon firms are those with the 
highest long term debt ratio (19.4%), the German civil law firms are those with the lowest 
long term debt (9.6%). On the contrary, if we focus on the short term debt, we can see how 
French civil law firms are the most leveraged companies whereas Anglo-Saxon firms are the 
least ones. In turn, different kinds of debt seem to have an asymmetric role: common law 
firms appear to be more prone to long term debt whereas civil law firms tend to borrow to 
short term. Among the possible explanations to these results, we could cite that both the 
legal protection of investors and the quality of legal enforcement foster long term lending 
relations, as well as institutional investors and the activity in capital markets –more often in 
common law countries than in civil law ones.  
Once we have checked the differences between legal systems in terms of capital 
structure, we can test whether the factors determining firms’ financial choices are responsible 
for those differences. We have made capital structure depend on four of the factors which 
are most usually supposed to affect a firm’s finance: growth opportunities (MTB), firm size 
(LNSALES), firm performance (EBITDA) and assets tangibility (TANG). The results of the 
regression analysis with the method of panel data are reported in Tables 5 and 6. For each 
explanatory variable and for each measure of capital structure four estimations are provided. 
The first one has been run over the entire sample while the second, the third and the fourth 
are estimated for the Anglo-Saxon, the French and the German tradition of civil law system 
respectively. 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 
In general terms, the results reported in Table 5 show a common pattern for the four 
explanatory variables in all the legal systems and for all the measures of capital structure. 
Although we do not aim to explain corporate finance decisions in each institutional framework 
but simply to show the common and the distinctive features, we should try to provide some 
justification for these results. 
Growth opportunities and firm performance are proved to have a negative and 
significant relation with financial leverage, whereas the size of the firm and the assets 
tangibility is positively related. These results can be explained by the link between the size of 
the firm and the asymmetric information in capital markets (Ojah and Manrique, 2005). Since 
large companies are usually better known in capital markets, there is less asymmetry 
between a firm’s informed managers and investors, so that large firms can more easily 
borrow from capital markets. The negative relation between debt and firm performance has 
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been widely documented by previous research into the pecking order theory of capital 
structure (Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Nevertheless, the effect of growth 
opportunities and assets tangibility requires further explanation. 
As far as growth opportunities are concerned, their negative impact -when significant- 
is noticeable and coherent with previous research (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). A more 
detailed analysis as a function of maturity structure confirms that firms with more growth 
opportunities rely on commercial debt because this kind of debt does not impose such 
constraining covenants as other types of credit (Barclay and Smith, 1999). 
Table 5 also shows how assets tangibility is positively related to debt for all the 
measures of capital structure and in all the legal systems. This result can be explained on the 
basis of tangible assets as collateral: the more important the tangible assets are the more 
collateral the firm puts and, consequently, the lower the interest rate is. Notwithstanding, 
Table 6 shows remarkable differences conditional upon the kind of debt: whereas TANG is 
positively related to LTDTA, it is negatively related to STDTA. This means that long term debt 
is likely to fund long term assets (which can be put as collateral for long term debt) and short 
term debt will fund current assets. 
To sum up, our results up to this point show: 1) Noticeable and quite consistent 
differences in the level of financial leverage across the firms from different legal systems; 2) 
Financial leverage is affected by the same factors which have traditionally been supposed to 
explain capital structure. But, if this is the case, one should question how the same factors 
could produce such large differences across the systems or, more precisely, across 
countries. This is why, in the subsequent analysis, we introduce two country specific 
characteristics which are related to the legal and institutional framework: law enforcement 
and the quality of accounting. Based on data from La Porta et al. (1998), we have defined 
two dummy variables (DEL and DQA) that equal 1 if law enforcement or the quality of 
accounting is above the mean of the sample3. These dummy variables have interacted with 
the four explanatory variables in order to test if they have differential effects conditioned by 
the law enforcement and the quality of accounting. 
Results are displayed in Table 7. For the sake of simplicity, we will just comment on 
the most general and common features instead of a too detailed explanation of the results. 
 
3 The countries with the best law enforcement in our sample are Canada, The United States, Belgium, 
Holland and Austria, whereas the countries with the best quality of accounting are Canada, The United 
Kingdom, The United States, France, Holland and Spain. It is interesting to note that this classification 
differs from the civil vs. common law, so that the dummy variables do not measure the legal tradition 
but these two features of the legal and institutional setting. 
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The interacting variables are quite significant, so we can assert that growth opportunities, the 
size and performance of the firm, and the assets tangibility have a different effect depending 
on those two characteristics. Two results, nevertheless, deviate from this pattern: neither the 
interaction of MTB and the dummy of quality accounting nor the interaction of TANG and 
quality accounting seem to have a significant impact. Excluding these exceptions, Table 7 is 
interesting because it suggests that different levels of leverage are not per se a result of the 
legal environment, but that the legal setting creates the conditions so that those factors have 
a differential impact. 
We have run some additional regressions in order to check the robustness of our 
results. Firstly, we have defined a dummy variable for each institutional setting. These 
dummies (DFC and DGC4) have interacted with the four above-mentioned explanatory 
variables to test possible differential effects depending on the legal system. Results are 
shown in Table 8 and are consistent with previous ones: the four variables continue to be 
significant and, in addition, the interacting variables are also statistically significant, with the 
sole exception of MTB in some estimations. Since a very exhaustive explanation might 
obscure the general meaning of the regression, just a general comment can be suitable: the 
high significance of the interacting variables allows us to infer that the four determinants of 
capital structure have a differential influence in each legal system. 
Another sensitivity analysis takes into account the possible endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. As some authors have pointed out (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen, 
1986; McConnell and Servaes, 1995), some firms’ characteristics that we have assumed 
exogeneous could be affected by the firms’ capital structure. Thus, we have replicated the 
previous regressions with the generalized method of moments (GMM) to control for the 
potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables (Table 9). Results basically remain the 
same as the previous ones with two small exceptions: PROF is no longer as significant as it 
was and MTB coefficients are inconsistent for some estimations. Notwithstanding, the 
Hansen test, which aims to control the overidentification restrictions –and, consequently, the 
validity of instruments- does not support the accuracy of the instruments. Additionally, the 
second order serial correlation would advise some caveat in analyzing GMM results because 
the weakness of the instruments reduces the efficiency of the estimations and increases the 
possible bias. 
 
4 Dummy for the French civil and the German civil countries. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Recent research has shown the influence of the legal and institutional setting on firms’ 
financial decisions. These decisions are no longer due just to firms’ value enhancement 
strategies but are also affected by the legal framework in which firms operate. Our paper 
joins analyses of firms’ capital structure in an international framework in order to test 
differences across countries or legal systems and to find common points in the factors 
potentially affecting capital structure. 
We begin with a division of the countries according to the characteristics of the 
corporate system. The traditional bank-oriented vs. market-oriented classification scheme is 
no longer practical enough and we need to use more precise criteria based on the legal 
origin of institutions. In fact, as a first conclusion of our paper, we can assert that the global 
consideration of the bank oriented system is inexact since it includes a number of countries 
with fairly different corporate systems. When we decompose capital structure in a set of 
different measures, we find that the firms in the French tradition of civil law countries are 
more leveraged than their common law counterparts and we also find that the firms in the 
German tradition of civil law are the least leveraged ones. More important than the level of 
leverage, our analysis reveals a clear difference in debt maturity so that, the more the rights 
of investors are protected, the longer the term of the debt becomes.   
Although the use of debt is different across legal systems, the factors traditionally 
thought as determinants of capital structure have much in common in different financial 
systems. Although the performance and the size of the firm, the assets tangibility and growth 
opportunities have a similar effect in the three scenarios, there are specific effects conditional 
on the legal systems. Consequently, our results suggest that the effect of the factors that 
have traditionally been considered determinants of capital structure depends on the legal and 
institutional setting and that these differential effects can explain international disparities in 
capital structure. Our research has also shown that the introduction of some variables 
concerning the legal protection of investors, such as the enforcement of the law and the 
quality of the financial information, can help to explain firms’ financial choices. 
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Table 1: Sample distribution across countries  
Countries Number of firms Countries Number of firms
United States 2,827 Holland 185 
United Kingdom 675 Belgium 102 
Canada 464 Italy 209 
Total common law 4,066 France 564 
Germany 671 Spain 103 
Austria 92 Total French civil law 1,163 
Total German civil law 763 Total 5,992 
Table 2: Mean value of debt conditional upon the legal system 
The whole number of observations is 18,003 for common law countries, 4,854 for the French tradition 
of civil law countries and 3,029 from the German tradition of the civil law countries. B1 and M1 are all-
items including definitions of capital structure, B2 and M2 includes just costly debt and B3 and M3 are 
scaled by costly liabilities. LTDTA and STDTA stand for long term debt or short term debt to total 
assets respectively. COMTA stands for commercial debt to total assets ratio and OSTTA for other 
short term debt to total assets ratio.  
 Mean  Mean 
B1 Anglo. 0,3279 LTDTA Anglo. 0,1946
French 0,3894 French 0,1319
Germ. 0,2839 Germ. 0,0968
Total 0,3343 Total 0,1714
B2 Anglo. 0,2368 STDTA Anglo. 0,1334
French 0,2313 French 0,2575
Germ. 0,1896 Germ. 0,1871
Total 0,2302 Total 0,1629
B3 Anglo. 0,3276 COMTA Anglo. 0,0912
French 0,3780 French 0,1581
Germ. 0,3186 Germ. 0,0943
Total 0,3360 Total 0,1041
OSTTA Anglo. 0,0422
French 0,0994
Germ. 0,0928
Total 0,0588
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Table 3: Analysis of the variance depending on the legal system 
Square 
mean F-Test p-value 
 Square 
mean F-Test p-value 
B1 Between-groups 11.585 336.06 0.000 LTDTA 17.048 673.608 0.000
Within-groups 0.034 0.025
B2 Between-groups 2.886 94.35 0.000 STDTA 30.462 2273.038 0.000
Within-groups 0.030 0.013
B3 Between-groups 5.376 93.90 0.000 COMTA 8.725 1288.853 0.000
Within-groups 0.057 0.006
OSTTA 8.238 1427.425 0.000
0.005
Table 4: Bilateral post-hoc tests 
 System I System II Difference  p-value  Difference p-value 
B1 Anglo. French -0,061 0,000 LTDTA 0,062 0,000 
German 0,044 0,000  0,097 0,000 
 French German 0,105 0,000  0,035 0,000 
B2 Anglo. French 0,005 0,055 STDTA -0,124 0,000 
 German 0,047 0,000  -0,053 0,000 
 French German 0,041 0,000  0,070 0,000 
B3 Anglo. French -0,050 0,000 COMTA -0,066 0,000 
 German 0,009 0,056  -0,003 0,052 
 French German 0,059 0,000  0,063 0,000 
 OSTTA -0,057 0,000 
 -0,050 0,000 
 0,006 0,000 
Comment [Y1]: Los comas no 
deberían de ser puntos. Quiero decir 
decimal (que es punto en inglés) y no mil 
(que es coma en inglés? 
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Table 5: Factors affecting capital structure.
Estimated coefficients and (t-statistics). *** for a confidence level higher than 99%, ** for a confidence level higher than 95% and * for a confidence level higher
than 90%. Hausman test follows a 2 distribution with so many degrees of freedom as estimated coefficients.
B1 B2 B3
Total Anglo French German Total Anglo French German Total Anglo French German
MTB
-0.0007
(-1.62)
-0.0001
(-0.35)
0,002
(1.91)*
-0,002
(-1.84)*
-0.001
(-4.04)**
-0.001
(-2.50)**
-0,000
(-0.15)
-0,002
(-2.07)**
-0.001
(-2.76)**
-0.001
(-1.63)
0,001
(0.54)
-0,001
(-0.64)
LSALES
0.036
(22.38)**
0.028
(14.80)**
0,065
(17.55)**
0,064
(11.93)**
0.028
(17.77)**
0.021
(11.60)**
0,053
(15.37)**
0,044
(8.37)**
0.049
(22.64)**
0.036
(14.75)**
0,094
(18.39)**
0,088
(10.93)**
PROF
-0.081
(22.49)**
-0.092
(-20.90)**
-0,290
(-16.04)**
-0,025
(-3.70)**
-0.070
(-20.34)**
-0.080
(-18.85)**
-0,259
(-15.71)**
-0,019
(-2.93)**
-0.106
(-22.32)**
-0.119
(-20.98)**
-0,422
(-17.33)**
-0,034
(-3.33)**
TANG 0.123(16.38)**
0.122
(13.73)**
0,055
(2.89)**
0,163
(7.73)**
0.197
(27.12)**
0.192
(22.35)**
0,186
(10.37)**
0,203
(9.92)**
0.215
(21.47)**
0.207
(18.10)***
0,137
(5.18)**
0,284
(9.05)**
Adj.-R2 0.1443 0.1950 0.0657 0.0805 0.2188 0.2750 0.0890 0.0710 0.2221 0.2864 0.1420 0.1324
Hausman test 509.79** 449.59** 164.47** 62.57** 377.63** 341.22** 158.53** 46.74** 390.14** 366.13** 137.88** 56.93**
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Table 6: Factors determining capital structure. 
Estimated coefficients and (t-statistics). *** for a confidence level higher than 99%, ** for a 
confidence level higher than 95% and * for a confidence level higher than 90%. Hausman test 
follows a 2 distribution with so many degrees of freedom as estimated coefficients.  
 LTDTA     STDTA   
Total Anglo French German  Total Anglo French German. 
MTB -0.001 
(-2.23)** 
-0.001 
(-1.74)*
-0,001 
(-0.29) 
-0,001 
(-0.45) 
 0.001 
(0.59) 
0.001 
(1.95)*
0,003 
(2.42)** 
-0,002 
(-1.67)*
LSALES 0.019 
(13.14)*** 
0.018 
(10.10)*** 
0,031 
(10.12)*** 
0,011 
(2.79)**
0.016 
(13.91)*** 
0.009 
(7.46)*** 
0,033 
(10.12)*** 
0,053 
(10.89)*** 
PROF -0.047 
(-14.16)*** 
-0.053 
(-12.69)*** 
-0,131 
(-8.83)*** 
-0,016 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.034 
(-12.77)*** 
-0.038 
(-12.76)*** 
-0,159 
(-10.14)*** 
-0,009 
(-1.48) 
TANG 0.174 
(25.13)*** 
0.172 
(20.17)*** 
0,194 
(12.07)*** 
0,149 
(9.41)*** 
-0.051 
(-9.20)*** 
-0.050 
(-8.33)*** 
-0,139 
(-8.2)*** 
0,014 
(0.74) 
Adj.-R2 0.2704 0.2821 0.1695 0.1475  0.0673 0.0734 0.0674 0.0482 
Hausman test 412.61*** 333.62*** 60.99*** 30.48*** 742.44*** 352.27*** 110.62*** 70.54*** 
COMTA     OSTTA   
Total Anglo French German  Total Anglo French German. 
MTB 0.001 
(5.89)*** 
0.001 
(6.12)*** 
0,003 
(3.76)*** 
0,001 
(0.36) 
 -0.001 
(-2.86)** 
-0.001 
(-1.27) 
0,001 
(0.14) 
-0,002 
(-2.03)** 
LSALES 0.008 
(13.69)*** 
0.006 
(10.50)*** 
0,011 
(5.73)*** 
0,020 
(8.54)*** 
0.008 
(7.81)*** 
0.003 
(2.56)** 
0,021 
(7.79)*** 
0,032 
(7.31)*** 
PROF -0.010 
(-7.54)*** 
-0.011 
(-7.79)*** 
-0,030 
(-3.17)*** 
-0,006 
(-1.91)*
-0.023 
(-10.19)***
-0.026 
(-10.24)*** 
-0,128 
(-9.67)*** 
-0,003 
(-0.59) 
TANG -0.073 
(-25.35)*** 
-0.070 
(-23.28)*** 
-0,130 
(-12.54)*** 
-0,039 
(-4.22)*** 
0.022 
(4.61)*** 
0.020 
(3.80)*** 
-0,008 
(-0.60) 
0,053 
(3.10)*** 
Adj.-R2 0.1580 0.1302 0.1797 0.1246  0.0013 0.0049 0.0025 0.0100 
Hausman test 617.32** 391.45** 59.42*** 45.04** 285.87*** 83.56*** 82.76*** 41.34*** 
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Table 7: Factors determining capital structure with law enforcement and the quality of accounting
Estimated coefficients and (t-statistics). *** for a confidence level higher than 99%, ** for a confidence level higher than 95% and * for a confidence level higher
than 90%. Hausman test follows a 2 distribution with so many degrees of freedom as estimated coefficients. Independent variables have interacted with a
dummy of law enforcement (DEL) and with a dummy of the quality of accounting (DQA)
B1 B2 B3 LTDTA STDTA COMTA OSTTA
MTB 0.001(1.08)
-0.0017
(-1.35)
-0.0007
(-0.8)
-0.0026
(-2.09)**
0.0008
(0.65)
-0.0017
(-1.02)
0.0005
(0.6)
-0.0007
(-0.55)
0.0005
(0.71)
-0.0011
(-1.14)
0.0017
(4.82)***
0.0008
(1.72)*
-0.0012
(-2.08)**
-0.0019
(-2.34)**
LSALES 0.0628(20.76)***
0.0704
(14.63)***
0.0489
(16.78)***
0.0493
(10.63)***
0.0851
(21.19)***
0.0937
(14.66)***
0.0302
(10.78)***
0.0184
(4.13)***
0.0327
(14.6)***
0.052
(14.66)***
0.0139
(11.91)***
0.0211
(11.39)***
0.0188
(9.67)***
0.0309
(10.02)***
PROF -0.138(-14.74)***
-0.0338
(-4.81)***
-0.1248
(-13.83)***
-0.0265
(-3.91)***
-0.2029
(-16.32)***
-0.0461
(-4.93)***
-0.062
(-7.15)***
-0.0187
(-2.88)***
-0.0761
(-10.99)***
-0.0151
(-2.91)***
-0.0132
(-3.66)***
-0.0073
(-2.7)***
-0.0629
(-10.46)***
-0.0078
(-1.73)*
TANG 0.1158(9.04)***
0.1457
(7.48)***
0.2071
(16.76)***
0.195
(10.39)***
0.2239
(13.16)***
0.2419
(9.36)***
0.1758
(14.82)***
0.1525
(8.47)***
-0.0599
(-6.33)***
-0.0068
(-0.47)
-0.0913
(-18.47)***
-0.0493
(-6.58)***
0.0314
(3.82)***
0.0425
(3.41)***
MTB*DLE -0.002(-1.89)*
-0.0013
(-1.26)
-0.003
(-2.07)**
-0.002
(-1.98)**
-0.0001
(-0.07)
-0.0007
(-1.75)**
0.0007
(0.97)
LSALES*DLE -0.0372(-10.33)***
-0.0298
(-8.59)***
-0.051
(-10.68)***
-0.0145
(-4.36)***
-0.0226
(-8.52)***
-0.0074
(-5.31)***
-0.0153
(-6.62)***
PROF*DLE 0.0677(6.67)***
0.0643
(6.58)***
0.1139
(8.46)***
0.0179
(1.91)**
0.0498
(6.64)***
0.0034
(0.87)
0.0464
(7.14)***
TANG*DLE 0.0078(0.49)
-0.0188
(-1.23)
-0.0196
(-0.93)
-0.0029
(-0.2)
0.0107
(0.92)
0.0266
(4.36)***
-0.0159
(-1.57)
MTB*DQA 0.0016(1.14)
0.0012
(0.89)
0.0006
(0.3)
-0.0002
(-0.18)
0.0018
(1.76)*
0.0004
(0.71)
0.0014
(1.6)
LSALES*DQA -0.0378(-7.39)***
-0.0237
(-4.81)***
-0.0498
(-7.32)***
0.0019
(0.41)
-0.0397
(-10.53)***
-0.0141
(-7.15)***
-0.0257
(-7.82)***
PROF*DQA -0.0645(-7.88)***
-0.0599
(-7.59)***
-0.0828
(-7.62)***
-0.0382
(-5.05)***
-0.0263
(-4.35)***
-0.0045
(-1.44)
-0.0217
(-4.14)***
TANG*DQA -0.0276(-1.31)
0.0008
(0.04)
-0.0338
(-1.21)
0.0248
(1.27)
-0.0523
(-3.36)***
-0.0284
(-3.49)***
-0.024
(-1.77)*
Adj-R2 0.0512 0.0447 0.0479 0.1207 0.0741 0.1135 0.0883 0.2816 0.1432 0.0597 0.1894 0.0494 0.054 0.0585
Hausman test 646.91*** 635.1*** 540.37*** 434.08*** 536.43*** 462.59*** 494.81*** 412.65*** 530.14*** 750.67*** 450.07*** 731.96*** 214.98** 255.6***
Comment [Y2]: Otra vez puntos y
comas?
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Table 8: Factors determining capital structure with dummy variables for institutional settings 
Estimated coefficients and (t-statistics). *** for a confidence level higher than 99%, ** for a confidence level 
higher than 95% and * for a confidence level higher than 90%. Hausman test follows a 2 distribution with so 
many degrees of freedom as estimated coefficients. Independent variables have interacted with dummy 
variables of the French civil system (DFC) and the German civil system (DGC). 
 B1 B2 B3 LTDTA STDTA COMTA OSTTA 
MTB -0.0002 (-0.36) 
-0.0014 
(-2.61)*** 
-0.0012 
(-1.64)* 
-0.001 
(-1.88)* 
0.0008 
(1.87)* 
0.0012 
(5.59)*** 
-0.0004 
(-1.21) 
LSALES 0.0285 (15.35)*** 
0.0216 
(12.08)*** 
0.0367 
(14.9)*** 
0.0187 
(10.88)*** 
0.0098 
(7.14)*** 
0.0069 
(9.59)*** 
0.0029 
(2.44)** 
PROF -0.092 (-21.68)*** 
-0.0804 
(-19.63)*** 
-0.1193 
(-21.19)*** 
-0.0538 
(-13.67)*** 
-0.0382 
(-12.21)*** 
-0.0117 
(-7.12)*** 
-0.0266 
(-9.76)*** 
TANG 0.1222 (14.25)*** 
0.1926 
(23.28)*** 
0.2079 
(18.29)*** 
0.1726 
(21.72)*** 
-0.0505 
(-7.97)*** 
-0.0704 
(-21.28)*** 
0.02 
(3.62)*** 
MTB*DFC 0.0028 (1.67)* 
0.0012 
(0.74) 
0.0022 
(1.00) 
0.0006 
(0.4) 
0.0022 
(1.76)* 
0.0016 
(2.48)** 
0.0006 
(0.53) 
LSALES*DFC 0.0368 (7.82)*** 
0.032 
(7.06)*** 
0.0581 
(9.32)*** 
0.013 
(2.99)*** 
0.0237 
(6.84)*** 
0.0048 
(2.62)*** 
0.019 
(6.29)*** 
PROF*DFC -0.1981 (-9.48)*** 
-0.1793 
(-8.9)*** 
-0.3034 
(-10.95)*** 
-0.0774 
(-4.00)*** 
-0.1207 
(-7.83)*** 
-0.0188 
(-2.33)** 
-0.1019 
(-7.6)*** 
TANG*DFC -0.067 (-2.81)*** 
-0.0065 
(-0.28) 
-0.0707 
(-2.24)** 
0.0221 
(1.00) 
-0.0891 
(-5.07)*** 
-0.0604 
(-6.58)*** 
-0.0286 
(-1.87)* 
MTB*DGC -0.0022 (-1.52) 
-0.0012 
(-0.89) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
0.0005 
(0.38) 
-0.0027 
(-2.54)** 
-0.001 
(-1.72)* 
-0.0018 
(-1.88)* 
LSALES*DGC 0.0364 (6.15)*** 
0.0225 
(3.94)*** 
0.0518 
(6.6)*** 
-0.0073 
(-1.34) 
0.0437 
(10.01)*** 
0.0139 
(6.08)*** 
0.0298 
(7.85)*** 
PROF*DGC 0.0666 (8.03)*** 
0.0608 
(7.6)*** 
0.0851 
(7.74)*** 
0.0375 
(4.88)*** 
0.029 
(4.75)*** 
0.0058 
(1.81)* 
0.0233 
(4.37)*** 
TANG*DGC 0.041 (1.75)* 
0.0104 
(0.46) 
0.0763 
(2.46)** 
-0.0235 
(-1.08) 
0.0645 
(3.73)*** 
0.0306 
(3.39)*** 
0.0339 
(2.25)** 
Adj.-R2 0.068 0.0905 0.1096 0.1802 0.0824 0.0430 0.0815 
Hausman test 658.3*** 500.73*** 521.0*** 445.24**** 594.38*** 569.75*** 233.2*** 
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Table 9: Factors determining capital structure (GMM estimation)  
Estimated coefficients and (t-statistics). *** for a confidence level higher than 99%, ** for a confidence level 
higher than 95% and * for a confidence level higher than 90%. Wald test is a test of joint significance for all the 
variables. Hansen test of overidentification restrictions allows controlling the validity of instruments and follows a 
2 distribution with so many degrees of freedom as the difference between the number of instruments and the 
number of regressors. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests or first and second order serial correlation. 
B1 B2 B3 LTDTA STDTA COMTA OSTTA 
MTB 0,0085 
(2,9)*** 
0,0048 
(1,82)* 
0,0019 
(0,55) 
0,0025 
(1,09) 
0,0064 
(4,06)*** 
0,0053 
(5,69)*** 
0,0008 
(0,65) 
LSALES 0,0298 
(5,56)*** 
0,0253 
(5,66)*** 
0,0433 
(6,87)*** 
0,0169 
(4,06)*** 
0,0178 
(5,64)*** 
0,0037 
(1,64)* 
0,0084 
(4,37)*** 
PROF -0,0444 
(-1,34) 
-0,0902 
(-3,06)*** 
-0,0972 
(-2,35)** 
-0,0504 
(-2,46)** 
-0,0211 
(-1,21) 
0,0004 
(0,08) 
-0,0344 
(-2,55)** 
TANG 0,1862 
(10,11)*** 
0,229 
(13,23)*** 
0,2502 
(10,89)*** 
0,2133 
(14,15)*** 
-0,0458 
(-3,49)*** 
-0,0424 
(-5,84)*** 
0,0071 
(0,68) 
Wald test 164,6*** 276,9*** 245,5*** 273,6*** 59,7*** 96,6*** 28,3*** 
Hansen test 19,412*** 13,28** 10,07 7,52 14,97** 77,82*** 20,03*** 
AR(1) -7,15*** -7,37*** -6,29*** -10,04*** -13,41*** -8,81*** -12,69*** 
AR(2) -5.59*** -5,04*** -4,84*** -4,73*** -4,84*** -2,19** -4,03*** 
* The authors are grateful to Alan Hynds, Giorgio Valente (co-editor of Applied Economics) and an anonymous 
referee for their comments. 
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